| | |
| Preface | vii |
1. |
Parkinson's Law,
or The Rising Pyramid | 2 |
2. | The Will of the People,
or Annual General Meeting | 14 |
3. | High Finance,
or The Point of Vanishing Interest | 24 |
4. | Directors and
Councils,
or Coefficient of Inefficiency | 33 |
5. | The Short List,
or Principles of Selection | 45 |
6. | Plans and Plants,
or The Administration Block | 59 |
7. | Personality Screen,
or The Cocktail Formula | 70 |
8. | Injelititis,
or Palsied Paralysis | 78 |
9. | Palm Thatch to Packard,
or A Formula for Success | 91 |
10. | Pension Point,
or The Age of Retirement | 101 |
xi
1. PARKINSON'S LAW, OR THE RISING PYRAMID
WORK EXPANDS so as to fill the time available for its completion.
General recognition of this fact is shown in the proverbial phrase "It is
the busiest man who has time to spare." Thus, an elderly lady of leisure can
spend the entire day in writing and dispatching a postcard to her niece at
Bognor Regis. An hour will be spent in finding the postcard, another in
hunting for spectacles, half an hour in a search for the address, an hour
and a quarter in composition, and twenty minutes in deciding whether or not
to take an umbrella when going to the mailbox in the next street. The total
effort that would occupy a busy man for three minutes all told may in this
fashion leave another person prostrate after a day of doubt, anxiety, and
toil.
Granted that work (and especially paperwork) is thus elastic in its
demands on time, it is manifest that there need be little or no relationship
between the work to be done and the size of the staff to which it may be
assigned. A lack of real activity does not, of necessity, result in leisure.
A lack of occupation is not necessarily revealed by a manifest idleness. The
thing to be done swells in importance and complexity in a direct ratio with
the time to be spent. This fact 2 is widely recognized, but less attention
has been paid to its wider implications, more especially in the field of
public administration. Politicians and taxpayers have assumed (with
occasional phases of doubt) that a rising total in the number of civil
servants must reflect a growing volume of work to be done. Cynics, in
questioning this belief, have 3 imagined that the multiplication of
officials must have left some of them idle or all of them able to work for
shorter hours. But this is a matter in which faith and doubt seem equally
misplaced. The fact is that the number of the officials and the quantity of
the work are not related to each other at all. The rise in the total of
those employed is governed by Parkinson's Law and would be much the same
whether the volume of the work were to increase, diminish, or even
disappear. The importance of Parkinson's Law lies in the fact that it is a
law of growth based upon an analysis of the factors by which that growth is
controlled.
The validity of this recently discovered law must rest mainly on
statistical proofs, which will follow. Of more interest to the general
reader is the explanation of the factors underlying the general tendency to
which this law gives definition. Omitting technicalities (which are
numerous) we may distinguish at the outset two motive forces. They can be
represented for the present purpose by two almost axiomatic statements,
thus: (1) "An official wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals" and (2)
"Officials make work for each other."
To comprehend Factor 1, we must picture a civil servant, called A, who
finds himself overworked. Whether this overwork is real or imaginary is
immaterial, but we should observe, in passing, that A's sensation (or
illusion) might easily result from his own decreasing energy: a normal
symptom of middle age. For this real or imagined overwork there are, broadly
speaking, three possible remedies. He may resign; he may ask to halve the
work with a colleague called B; he may demand the assistance of two
subordinates, to be called C and D. There is probably no instance 4 in
history, however, of A choosing any but the third alternative. By
resignation he would lose his pension rights. By having B appointed, on his
own level in the hierarchy, he would merely bring in a rival for promotion
to W's vacancy when W (at long last) retires. So A would rather have C and
D, junior men, below him. They will add to his consequence and, by dividing
the work into two categories, as between C and D, he will have the merit of
being the only man who comprehends them both. It is essential to realize at
this point that C and D are, as it were, inseparable. To appoint C alone
would have been impossible. Why? Because C, if by himself, would divide the
work with A and so assume almost the equal status that has been refused in
the first instance to B; a status the more emphasized if C is A's only
possible successor. Subordinates must thus number two or more, each being
thus kept in order by fear of the other's promotion. When C complains in
turn of being overworked (as he certainly will) A will, with the concurrence
of C, advise the appointment of two assistants to help C. But he can then
avert internal friction only by advising the appointment of two more
assistants to help D, whose position is much the same. With this recruitment
of E, F, G, and H the promotion of A is now practically certain.
Seven officials are now doing what one did before. This is where Factor
2 comes into operation. For these seven make so much work for each other
that all are fully occupied and A is actually working harder than ever. An
incoming document may well come before each of them in turn. Official E
decides that it falls within the province of F, who places a draft reply
before C, who amends it drastically before consulting D, who asks G to deal
with it. But G goes 5 on leave at this point, handing the file over to H,
who drafts a minute that is signed by D and returned to C, who revises his
draft accordingly and lays the new version before A.
What does A do? He would have every excuse for signing the thing
unread, for he has many other matters on his mind. Knowing now that he is to
succeed W next year, he has to decide whether C or D should succeed to his
own office. He had to agree to G's going on leave even if not yet strictly
entitled to it. He is worried whether H should not have gone instead, for
reasons of health. He has looked pale recently-- partly but not solely
because of his domestic troubles. Then there is the business of F's special
increment of salary for the period of the conference and E's application for
transfer to the Ministry of Pensions. A has heard that D is in love with a
married typist and that G and F are no longer on speaking terms-- no one
seems to know why. So A might be tempted to sign C's draft and have done
with it. But A is a conscientious man. Beset as he is with problems created
by his colleagues for themselves and for him-- created by the mere fact of
these officials' existence-- he is not the man to shirk his duty. He reads
through the draft with care, deletes the fussy paragraphs added by C and H,
and restores the thing back to the form preferred in the first instance by
the able (if quarrelsome) F. He corrects the English-- none of these young
men can write grammatically-- and finally produces the same reply he would
have written if officials C to H had never been born. Far more people have
taken far longer to produce the same result. No one has been idle. All have
done their best. And it is late in the evening before A finally quits his
office and begins the return journey to Ealing. The last of 6 the office
lights are being turned off in the gathering dusk that marks the end of
another day's administrative toil. Among the last to leave, A reflects with
bowed shoulders and a wry smile that late hours, like gray hairs, are among
the penalties of success.
From this description of the factors at work the student of political
science will recognize that administrators are more or less bound to
multiply. Nothing has yet been said, however, about the period of time
likely to elapse between the date of A's appointment and the date from which
we can calculate the pensionable service of H. Vast masses of statistical
evidence have been collected and it is from a study of this data that
Parkinson's Law has been deduced. Space will not allow of detailed analysis
but the reader will be interested to know that research began in the British
Navy Estimates. These were chosen because the Admiralty's responsibilities
are more easily measurable than those of, say, the Board of Trade. The
question is merely one of numbers and tonnage. Here are some typical
figures. The Strength of the Navy in 1914 could be shown as 146,000 officers
and men, 3249 dockyard officials and clerks, and 57,000 dockyard workmen. By
1928 there were only 100,000 officers and men and only 62,439 workmen, but
the dockyard officials and clerks by then numbered 4558. As for warships,
the strength in 1928 was a mere fraction of what it had been in 1914-- fewer
than 20 capital ships in commission as compared with 62. Over the same
period the Admiralty officials had increased in number from 2000 to 3569,
providing (as was remarked) "a magnificent navy on land." These figures are
more clearly set forth in tabular form. 7
ADMIRALTY STATISTICS No. of Members | |
6 | Honduras, Luxembourg |
7 | Haiti, Iceland, Switzerland
|
9 | Costa Rica, Ecuador, N. Ireland, Liberia, Panama,
Philippines, Uruguay |
10 | Guatemala, El Salvador, United States
|
11 | Brazil, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay |
12 |
Bolivia, Chile, Peru |
13 | Colombia, Dominican R., Norway,
Thailand |
14 | Denmark, India, S. Africa, Sweden |
15 |
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iran, New Zealand, Portugal, Venezuela |
16 | Iraq, Netherlands, Turkey |
17 | Eire, Israel, Spain
|
18 | Egypt, Gt. Britain, Mexico |
19 | W. Germany,
Greece, Indonesia, Italy |
20 | Australia, Formosa, Japan |
21 | Argentina, Burma, Canada, France |
22 | China |
24
| E. Germany |
26 | Bulgaria |
27 | Cuba |
29
| Rumania |
32 | Czechoslovakia |
35 | Yugoslavia
|
38 | USSR |
How do other countries compare in this respect? The majority of
non-totalitarian countries have cabinets that number between 12 and 20
members. Taking the average 40 of over 60 countries, we find that it comes
to over 16; the most popular numbers are 15 (seven instances) and 9 (seven
again). Easily the queerest cabinet is that of New Zealand, one member of
which has to be announced as "Minister of Lands, Minister of Forests,
Minister of Maori Affairs, Minister in charge of Maori Trust Office and of
Scenery Preservation." The toastmaster at a New Zealand banquet must be
equally ready to crave silence for "The Minister of Health, Minister
Assistant to the Prime Minister, Minister in Charge of State Advances
Corporation, Census, and Statistics Department, Public Trust Office and
Publicity and Information." In other lands this oriental profusion is
fortunately rare.
A study of the British example would suggest that the point of
ineffectiveness in a cabinet is reached when the total membership exceeds 20
or perhaps 21. The Council of the Crown, the King's Council, the Privy
Council had each passed the 20 mark when their decline began. The present
British cabinet is just short of that number now, having recoiled from the
abyss. We might be tempted to conclude from this that cabinets-- or other
committees -- with a membership in excess of 21 are losing the reality of
power and that those with a larger membership have already lost it. No such
theory can be tenable, however, without statistical proof. Table II on the
preceding page attempts to furnish part of it.
Should we be justified in drawing a line in that table under the name
of France (21 cabinet members) with an explanatory note to say that the
cabinet is not the real power in countries shown below that line? Some
comitologists would accept that conclusion without further 41 research.
Others emphasize the need for careful investigation, more especially around
the borderline of 21. But that the coefficient of inefficiency must lie
between 19 and 22 is now very generally agreed.
What tentative explanation can we offer for this hypothesis? Here we
must distinguish sharply between fact and theory, between the symptom and
the disease. About the most obvious symptom there is little disagreement. It
is known that with over 20 members present a meeting begins to change
character. Conversations develop separately at either end of the table. To
make himself heard, the member has therefore to rise. Once on his feet, he
cannot help making a speech, if only from force of habit. "Mr. Chairman," he
will begin, "I think I may assert without fear of contradiction-- and I am
speaking now from twenty-five (I might almost say twenty-seven) years of
experience-- that we must view this matter in the gravest light. A heavy
responsibility rests upon us, sir, and I for one..." Amid all this drivel
the useful men present, if there are any, exchange little notes that read,
"Lunch with me tomorrow-- we'll fix it then."
What else can they do? The voice drones on interminably. The orator
might just as well be talking in his sleep. The committee of which he is the
most useless member has ceased to matter. It is finished. It is hopeless. It
is dead.
So much is certain. But the root cause of the trouble goes deeper and
has still, in part, to be explored. Too many vital factors are unknown. What
is the shape and size of the table? What is the average age of those
present? At what hour does the committee meet? In a book for the 42
non-specialist it would be absurd to repeat the calculations by which the
first and tentative coefficient of inefficiency has been reached. It should
be enough to state that prolonged research at the Institute of Comitology
has given rise to a formula which is now widely (although not universally)
accepted by the experts in this field. It should perhaps be explained that
the investigators assumed a temperate climate, leather-padded chairs and a
high level of sobriety. On this basis, the formula is as follows:
x=(m