understandings reached by Gorbachev and
Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit
of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the
beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound
reforms.
On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists
opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later
the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the
elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm.
Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its
former allies?
Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a
number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that
between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and
to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist
parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of
the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform
processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more
that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised
trial.
From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations
these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the
analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly
overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of
the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for
complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the
first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new
world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and
Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the
beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and
political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a
different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a
consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the
requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party
system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
Only history will decide what would have been best for the world --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say
personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR
before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a
super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting
anything in return.
And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out
beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves
the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and
clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern
European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to
world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global
world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world
globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...
6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE
Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a
confirmation
of the thesis that the political process is not a series of
happenstances but is rather
governed by a definite logical process.
A
fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the
former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to
power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former
communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was
repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise
to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had
well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for
pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika.
Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a
strong influence on the political situation.
The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the
"mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical
and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of
political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained
specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from
extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between
economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious
political clashes and crime.
The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and
during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with
significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former
state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to
control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in
the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
The second important reason was the disappointment of the population.
One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social
privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and
fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued.
Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the
period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open
world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become
France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European
countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by
many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset.
Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the
population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they
undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social
strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this
reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult
future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in
it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier,
their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in
Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned
sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will
fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions,
while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests.
Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future
will show us.
Chapter Three
COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS
Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and
disorder.
The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...
T
he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena.
Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and
growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and
cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two
super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been
destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of
certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in
this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern
Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost
their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very
important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is
affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of
new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc..
Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is
only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main
foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar
model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general
collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the
processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The
problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation
has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and
global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of
nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any
longer believes that disarmament is irreversible.
In the context of the bi-polar model the world was governed by two
super powers and a group of nations dependent on them. Today the level of
direct government has sharply declined. After the collapse of the USSR a
number of new pretenders to world leadership have appeared and before our
very eyes the roles and relations of former allies have changed radically.
Politics is no longer two-dimensional but an equation with hundreds of
unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great powers can
be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain
states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate
that the old political tradition, the tradition of the bi-polar world has
long since passed away.
Or let us take Europe. The unification of the two Germanies did not
only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created
complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the
burden of unification on to its European partners via the mechanisms of
international financial relations. The integration of the two German states
has changed the structure of Europe and the relations of the states within
it. The granting ofassociate membership status to the Eastern European
countries within the structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively
easy task but was soon delayed almost indefinitely. This was to a certain
extent because of the unwillingness of Russia to allow itself to be
encircled by a new "iron" or other type of curtain. The place and role of
Russia itself in the global community are still unclear.
In the global aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has
had even greater consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its
economic potential to all intents and purposes removed one of the two main
super powers from the geo-political map. Only the USA remains. A number of
years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super
powers are no longer necessary. France has offered to extend its nuclear
umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have demonstrated their desires to
become permanent members of the Security Council.Russia has officially
requested membership of the group of the most developed nations.
The collapse of the Eastern European economic and political structures
has opened up a hole in world economic relations with consequences for the
world economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed
into Eastern Europe. West Germany's great commitments to its new Eastern
provinces have resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the European
exchange rate system. Without the burdens of such problems, Japan and a
number of other countries in the Far East have continued to develop their
potential and to exert more and more influence on the world economic
processes. China has demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing
economy. The changes in South Africa and the forthcoming transition in Hong
Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds.
In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I
emphasised on several occasions that geo-political turbulence will affect
the world financial systems. Even today few people really believe in this
although the facts are there for all to see. In the winter and spring of
1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world
financial markets became very worried and the most prominent financial
experts explained it away with the American budget deficit, the crisis of
the Mexican peso or ambitions to increase American export. What really
happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks
to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain
"invisible" private forces are already in control of the world economy and
are rarely affected by governmental influence.
Moreover, the first symptoms of uncotrollability appeared directly
after the collapse of the Brenton Woods system at the beginning of the
1970's when in March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed the dollar to float. For
almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to find its levels
via floating exchange rates and now we are on the eve of a new governmental
vacuum. The reason for this is the constant increase in the role of the
private banks and unidentified financial funds in global economics, the
growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In
the spring of 1995 the director of the International Monetary Fund,
M.Cammedessu, declared that in the near future and with its present
structures the IMF would not be able to continue to fulfil its functions.
"We are living in a dangerous world" were the words of Cammedessu. His
trepidations were emphasised by the constant growth in unregulated funds of
money as well as by the growing mountain of state and private debts etc..
Neither the present international financial system nor the entire world
economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises.
The chaos has affected the spiritual relations, thinking and value
systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with
negative repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic
movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of the West to act quickly
and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that
they are unable to offer a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts
to avoid divergence between reality and ideas have stated that it is no
longer political programmes or ideologies which are important but pragmatic
action. As in other similar historical transitional periods a large number
of people are confused and prefer to take refuge in local pragmatism and
finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common view about
how one should approach the new situation has opened the door to
nationalism, ethnic ambitions and xenophobia. A significant number of world
politicians have been compelled to turn their attention to current problem
solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It is becoming more and
more evident that there is a need for a global analysis on what is taking
place, its consequences and a search for a solution to the chaos which is
ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the
world, or how to solve our common problems: the global economic order, the
environment, poverty, religious tolerance, stabilisation of growth etc..
This is one of the reasons why nationalism often comes to the fore in the
search for solutions to global problems.
The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication
of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in
various institutions of higher education in the industrialised countries of
the world. In the less developed countries the situation is less clear. The
young people in these countries want to achieve the material prosperity of
the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan,
France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany, however, for quite a long time
now, students and young people have no overall idea about their future. The
ambition of achieving a certain level of material prosperity, a large bank
account, one's own business, to travel abroad and so on, are largely
manifestations of tradition rather than anything else.
But what does this mean? Healthy interests and the stability of the
system? Or, rather, a spiritual crisis in a vacuum expressed by the new
generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual
consumerism.
World history has witnessed other periods of chaos and disorder of
global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes
which are taking place today are not as the result of wars in which the
victor imposes his will with force. The globalisation of the world has led
to a universal crisis of the current world order. This is a crisis of the
entire world system, of national and regional thinking and consequently
everything else which typifies the Third Civilisation. Within global
relations there is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these
vacuums are not filled with adequate changes to world structures, there may
be indescribable consequences. Why has there been such an explosion of
religious sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global problem
and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people
becoming more alienated from politics? Why has fundamentalism spread into
new territories? Why has international crime grown so much?
The reason is that the current world order is not adequate to respond
to the new realities. NATO and the USA alone are not capable of resolving
world conflicts. This may even lead to a reaction from Russia or China and
new divisions within the world. The UN does not have the strength to stop
conflicts. It is becoming apparent that many elements of the current world
system are outdated and its major mechanisms have to be changed and
repaired.
The manifold lack of clarity in international political and economic
relations are an expression of an inadequately low level of agreement
between countries and the expectation that everything will resolve itself.
The disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the
basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much
more integrated. This should not be seen so much as an advantage but as a
condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration
to develop. This will also require some form of world coordination, of
mutually acceptable decisions and the growth in the role of organisations
such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems
with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will
require a relatively longer period. The new world order will develop
gradually, based on mutually agreeable action .This conclusion is based on
the fact that the real world powers are still acting from their position as
nation states and their national responsibilities and will only change the
international rules of the game within that context. This is logical but it
also carries a risk. Given a variety of events and varying conditions any
one country with a more dominant global role by changing its internal order
runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm.
Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis
not only of traditional international relations but also of the political
systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch
beyond the bounds of a single state and depend less and less on the
decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is
a decline in trust for traditional political systems and a need for new
decisions. Thus:
1. The lack of a mechanism for reliable international, economic and
political regulations;
2. The contradiction between the unlimited global power of world
corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions;
3. The reactions of 2.5-3 billion poor people in the unification of
humanity into a single mutually dependent whole;
4. The danger of new nationalism and the restoration the division of
the world into blocs;
5. The possibility of the bi-polar model being exchanged for a
mono-centric world structure and the domination of one or a group of rich
states;
6. The destruction of small cultures and the dilution of national
traditions and values;
7. The limitation of the private life of the individual and his
transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media;
8. The crisis of traditional political systems;
9. Terrorism and international crime;
All this factors are expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos -
an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs.
2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern
European
totalitarian regimes was the change in geo-political structures. The
bi-polar
world seems to have collapsed irreversibly.
T
he "modern" age which has occupied the last five centuries in the
development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of
nation states, of the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs.
After the collapse of the Berlin wall a series of global processes began
which were to lead to gradual but irreversible changes in the world
political order. Directly after the fall of the"totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe the majority of political commentators and researchers
considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and
a number of smaller Eastern European states and thereafter their inclusion
in the structures of the developed nations of NATO and the EU. Such
one-sided views continue to predominate today, despite the fact that most
people are aware of their inadequacies. The problem is that after the
explosion in Eastern Europe a slow but unstoppable process of universal
geopolitical change began. I refer to this process as "geo-political
collapse", since it affected the political structures typical of the entire
twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation.
What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let
us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia in
Central Asia there is a growing conflict of interests between a number of
Islamic states and China. The unification of Germany has changed the
proportionality of power in central Europe. There is no need for detailed
forecasts in this area although there are certain clear trends emerging
which seem to herald the end of the old world order.
The first wave of the geo-political collapse clearly took place in
Eastern Europe and most significantly in the USSR. The second will be
connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all
Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will
be to provide a balance with all the consequences which that entails. The
third wave will be a consequence of the increase in the economic and the
political importance of a number of smaller countries in South Eastern
Europe, Asia and Latin America.
At the beginning of the 1990's we were witnesses not only to the
collapse of the Eastern European political structures but also to the
potential of profound changes within the West. There is no doubt that the
borders of the European community will move towards the East and that the
role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant.
The consolidation of the European Union and the creation of a single
European currency which appears to have strong political
support[25] presuppose a number of changes in trans-Atlantic
cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties will weaken but I do
believe that the creation of a common European currency will bring about
many changes in their nature, scale and direction.
It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still do not
have the self-confidence and strength to undertake independent activities.
Even if this were to happen, such ideas would develop in isolation rather
than as a part of a logical process. For the moment the countries outside
the Group of 25 are strongly dependent on the most developed nations.
Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with growing ambitions
for more economic and political influence. Which will be stronger?
Integration or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence?
The question is whether the struggle for free economic and political
relations will begin in Asia, Africa or Latin America? Will this not be
stronger than the processes of global integration?
In any event one thing is clear - the old world order created between
the 18th and 19th centuries by a group of advanced European states and the
two super powers which emerged in the 20th century is now a thing of the
past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only
as a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. In the autumn of 1995 the
voters in Quebec very nearly voted for secession from Canada which could
have lead to the real collapse of the Canadian state. Almost daily,
politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate
the view that the USA should no longer play the role of a super power. In
Paris the views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the
fact that the world is undergoing transition. There are many processes and
situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations.
3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE
Colossal disproportions have accumulated within the financial systems
of the world. Until now they have not lead to any great crises because of
the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after its
total collapse are we not bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and
chaos?
O
n the 1st of September 1995 the world news agencies reported an
emerging financial crisis in the most prosperous of post-war economies -
Japan. Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu Credit
Union in Osaka and the Hiogo bank in Kobe which were then closed to all
kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion
US dollars or almost 1/4 of the total deposits of the union. The
bankruptcies of a number of Japanese credit unions and the unprecedented
problems they caused for a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the
stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is the
huge amount of debt accumulated in the 1980's when stock exchange prices
were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession.
The problem, however, is more complex. More and more people are
becoming aware of the fact that the debts accumulated by governments and
individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the
American government and the increased indebtedness of other developed
countries pose a question about the efficacy of the world financial system.
It is true that in contrast to the Great Depression of the 1939, the banks
and national governments now have much greater reserves and experience in
avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts
are possible in the conditions of guaranteed political economic regulation
and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is
based not only on their real condition but on their established monopoly of
the world markets.
It is not difficult to comprehend that if the geo-political
restructuring does take place then political and military factors will lose
their influence and the problem with debt will prove catastrophic. There is
a direct link between the changes in world political structures and
stability of the existing financial systems. Neither of them are adequate
for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering.
Of course, the world economy will